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1. The Problem 
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When we compare ( 1 )  and (2) we find that (2) is a stronger statement than ( 1 ) , in that 
(2) somehow more strongly requires that each boy be hungry. 
( 1 ) The boys are hungry 
(2) The boys are all hungry 
A first pass at how to capture this difference might be to treat all as i ntroducing 
universal quantification over the set denoted by the boys. However, the examples in 
(3-6) show that more must be said because all can felicitously combine with the 
collective predicate gather, and it does not disambiguate the mixed predicate build 
a raft in favor of a distributive reading. In these respects all contrasts with the 
universal quantifiers every and each . 
(3) The students gathered in the hallway 
(4) The students all gathered in the hallway 
(cf. ??Every/each student gathered in the hallway)  
(5) The girls built a raft (distributive or collective) 
(6) The girls all built a raft (distributive or collective) 
(cf. Every/each girl built a raft (distributive only)) 
What (2), (4) ,  and (6) have in common, despite the different types of predicates ,  is 
that all seems to make a sentence stronger. I Link ( 1 983)  called this "the total ity 
effect" and Dowty ( 1 987) called it " the maximizing effect . "  
The difficulty of  saying what all means lies in  capturing the totality effect of 
all, while allowing for it to combine with collective predicates like gather and build 
a raft. Link's approach to this problem was to introduce a semantic primitive T ,  
which is read "partakes in ." The T operator distributes down to each atomic 
individual in the subject NP the property of "partaking in" the action described by the 
predicate . So, for example, in the case of (4) , the presence of all ensures that each 
individual student took part in the gathering. Where we have a distributive predicate 
l ike be hungry, "partaking in" being hungry is equivalent to being hungry. 
Dowty takes Link's approach as a starting point and proposes that all operates . 
on a lex ical property of predicates that he calls "distributive subentailments . "  
© 1 997 b y  Chri stine Brisson 
Aaron Lawson (ed),  SALT VII, 55-72, Ithaca, NY: Cornell  University. 
56 CHRISTINE BRISSON 
Distributive subentailments describe what is required of each individual in the 
collective action in order for the action to come about. For example, the distributive 
subentailments of gather are something like, 'come to be in a common location at the 
same time as a lot of other people. '  In the case of distributive predicates, distributive 
subentailments equal simple distributivity . 
One possible objection to these proposals is that they introduce new semantic 
(or lexical) primitives for which there is no evidence, independent of all. And Taub 
( 1 989) has criticized Dowty's proposal on the grounds that his argument for the 
existence of subentailments is circular. But the argument I want to make against 
these proposals is  based on a different problem, to which I now turn. 
It is clear that the effect of all is to somehow strengthen the truth-conditions 
of a sentence with a definite plural NP subject. But the problem is, the meaning we 
assign to these sentences is already quite strong without all . 
Consider for now only the case of sentences with predicates that are 
distributive, like be hungry. Let us assume that a definite plural NP like the boys 
denotes a (first-order) set. On most theories of definite plural s ,  to interpret (7) we 
introduce a covert distributivity operator on the plural predicate (as in (8) ,  using 
Link's D) ,  which has the effect of introducing universal quantification over the 
members of the set that the subject denotes, as shown in (9) . 
(7) The boys are hungry 
(8) Dhungry'(the.boys) 
(9) V'x [xE lthe.boysl � xElhungryll 
( 1 0) The boys are all hungry 
This interpretation is common to theories of plurality such as Link ( 1 983), Lasersohn 
( 1 990, 1 995), and Schwarzschild ( 1 992, 1 996) (Exceptions include Landman 1 989 
and Schein 1 993) .  
But now we have a problem: it is clear, as we have already said, that ( 1 0) 
more strongly requires that each boy be hungry than (7) .  However, the interpretation 
we have assigned to (7) is already quite strong. How could ( 1 0) be stronger than the 
universally-quantified expression in (9)7 
To be sure, this problem has been noticed before . The discussion in Dowty 
( 1 987) makes it clear that he was aware of this problem, but he did not give any 
explicit semantic account of it. And Lasersohn ( 1 993 ,  ftn. 3) also notices it .  
I take it that we cannot give a coherent semantics for all unti l  we have a 
weaker semantics for sentences with definite plural NP's. In what follows I wi l l  
argue that we have independent reasons for weakening these sentences, and then 
propose a theory that allows for weakening. I then propose a semantics for all in 
which we do not need new semantic primitives to capture its strengthening effect. 
2. Pragmatic Weakening 
It has been widely noticed that sentences with definite plurals in  subject position 
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allow exceptions with more freedom than , say , sentences with universal quantifiers 
in subject position. It is also noted that the phenomenon seems to have a pragmatic 
character. For example, if the boys happens to denote a very big set of boys (say, the 
boys at a large single-sex prep school) then it is quite easy to allow 'loose' truth 
conditions for a sentence about the boys. Since the size of the set denoted by the 
boys is contextually  determined, it is clear that this is at least in part a pragmatic 
effect. So I call this effect "pragmatic weakening . "  
Other authors have noted this effect in very specialized sorts of  contexts. For 
example, we seem to allow for looser truth conditions when we understand a group 
of individuals to be operating as a team in some sense, as has been discussed 
extensively by Lasersohn ( 1 995) and Landman ( 1 996). 
I want to argue here that pragmatic weakening is not a peripheral or 
specialized phenomenon that our semantics can afford to ignore but rather a core 
property of definite plurals .  It occurs much more frequently than has been 
acknowledged, and does so with a wide range of predicates on the spectrum from 
strongly distributive to mixed-extension to collective. 2 
For example, suppose Stan and Tom are counselors in a boy's summer camp. 
Stan can remark that they had better serve dinner soon, because 
( I I )  The boys are hungry 
Stan's statement counts as true, even if one or two of the boys is not hungry. (Dowty 
1 987 also makes essentially the same point. )  And it counts as true even if the group 
is relatively small ,  with just six or seven members. 3 We're not concerned with each 
and every boy, partly because the context of utterance just doesn't demand that much 
precision . And of course be hungry is a distributive predicate . 
We see the same effect with collective predicates .  Suppose Kerry and Jane 
are counselors across the lake at the girls '  camp, and the girls of Cabin # 1 0  were 
assigned the job of building a raft together. If they do it, then Kerry can say 
( 1 2) The girls built a raft 
Again, ( 1 2) is true even if Alice was back in the cabin taking a nap while the others 
worked. And this sort of 'exception-allowing' has the exact same feel as what we saw 
in ( I I ) ,  suggesting that pragmatic weakening with both distributive and collective 
predicates has a common source. Whatever we ultimately say about pragmatic 
weakening, i t  wil l  need to apply both to distributive and to collective predicates. 
There is other, independent evidence that pragmatic weakening should be part 
of the semantics of definite plurals .  When we apply some standard tests for 
entailment versus implicature, the purported universal force of plural definites comes 
out to look more l ike an implicature than an entai lment. For example,  the universal 
force of plural definites is cancelable without contradiction .  (Grice; see also 
Levinson 1 983 ,  Horn 1 989) Compare ( 1 3) and ( 1 4) with the infe licitous ( 1 5) .  
( I 3) The boys are hungry, but Adam isn't/but not all of them. 
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( 1 4) The girls built a raft, but Mary slept through itlbut not all of them. 
( 1 5) #John managed to solve the problem but he didn't solve it .  
The alleged universal force is also reinforceable without redundancy (Sadock 1 978) .  
( 1 6) The boys -- in fact, all the boys -- are hungry 
( 1 7) The girls -- in fact, all the girls -- built a raft 
( 1 8) #John managed to -- and in fact did -- solve the problem 
I conclude that we need a semantics for definite plurals that gives them somewhat­
less-than-universal force, and takes into account the pragmatic nature of the 
weakening. 
3. Making Room for Pragmatic Weakening in the Semantics 
Here I propose a semantics for definite plurals that builds primarily on the theory of 
Schwarzschild ( 1 994, 1 996), which I will call the "generalized distributivity" theory . 
The generalized distributivity theory of plurals has two components that wi l l  
be crucial for me here. First, the theory incorporates the idea of covert di stributivity 
(ie, Link's D operator), but generalizes it so that distributivity isn't always 'al l  the way 
down' to atomic individual s :  Schwarzschild gives convincing arguments that 
sometimes we want our distributivity operator to distribute only down to subsums of 
a plurality. 
Secondly, information about exactly what subparts of a plurality the D 
operator is supposed to distribute down to comes from the pragmatic context of 
utterance. So if we are in a context where sums of individuals are salient, then the 
context provides this information to the D operator; i f  we are in  a context where 
atomic individuals are salient, then the context can provide this information to the D 
operator. This is accomplished by means of a variable whose value is contextual ly 
assigned . The D operator introduces universal quantification and the variable 
restricts the quantification to just the contextually salient sums or atomic individuals .  
Schwarzschild cal ls  his D operator Part, for partition, and the context­
dependent variable is  cal led Cov, because the value assigned to the variable always 
takes the form of a cover of the universe of discourse. From now on I will use these 
terms. 
Let us see how Part and Cov work together in the interpretation of a sentence 
by means of the following, by-now-famil iar example. 
( 1 9) The boys are hungry 
In translation, our covert distributivity operator Part applies to the plural predicate , 
yielding (20) . 
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(20) (Part(Cov)(hungry'))(the.boys') 
(20) i s  interpreted according to the rule in (2 1 ) ,  yielding the interpretation in (22) .  
(2 1 )  Interpretation rule (based on Schwarzschild 1 996): 
INlgE IPart(Cov)(V)lg iff Vx[xE ICovlg & xdNlg - xEIVlg] 
(22) V'x[xE ICovlg & xdthe.boys' l g - xE lhungry' lg] 
Note that the universal quantifier contributed to (22) by the Part operator has two 
conditions in its restriction : it takes the set denoted by the boys (as in  the standard 
use of a distributivity operator) and it takes a contextually-determined cover Of the 
universe of discourse. 
So in order to evaluate the truth conditions of (22), we must invent a universe 
of discourse and assign a value to Cov. A universe U and some possible covers of 
the set of singularities of U is given in (23) .  
(23) 
u = { a, b, c ,  s ,  t ,  { a,b } , { a,c } , { a,s } ,  { a,t } ,  { a,s , t , } . . .  } 
Ithe.boys' lg = { a,b,c } 
1 = { { a } ,  { b } ,  { c } , { s ,t } } 
J = { { a } ,  { c } ,  { b,s } ,  { t } } 
K = { { a,b,c } ,  { s } ,  { t }  } 
L = { { a,b } , { c ,s } , { t } } 
Suppose the context assigns the value I to Cov. Then the sentence will be interpreted 
exactly as we saw earlier in (7) ,  because since each boy occupies a singleton set of  
the cover assigned to  Cov ,  each boy is asserted to be in the extension of be hungry. 
In other words, assignment of a cover l ike I leads to a distributive interpretation of 
the sentence. 
Now consider the mixed predicate build a raft. The sentence is translated as 
in (25 ) ,  and interpreted as in (26) . 
(24) The boys built a raft 
(25) (Part(Cov )(buil t .raft') )(the.boys') 
(26) V'x [xE ICovlg & xdthe.boys' l g - xE lbuilt .raft'lg] 
If the context assigns I to Cov in (25) ,  the sentence will be interpreted distribut ively,  
and for exactly the same reason as (20), above, was .  In other words, the sentence wil l  
assert three separate raft-buildings. 
On the other hand, i f  the context assigns K to Cov, then the sentence wi l l  
assert that the se t  containing the boys is  in the extension of build a raft; in  other 
words, i t  wil l  assert that there was a single collective raft-building. 
So the respons ibil i ty for whether a sentence i s  interpreted distributively or 
collectively l ies in part with the context. If the context makes clear that we are 
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talking about individual boys, then Cov will take I as its value. If the context makes 
clear that we are talking about some collective action by the boys, then Cov will take 
K as its value. (If the context is not clear on this point, then there are other devices 
the language makes avai lable to clarify: words like together and each . See 
Schwarzschild 1 994 for discussion. )  
I say " in part" because we must also assume that the lexical semantics of the 
predicate plays some role in constraining the felicity of certain types of covers. For 
example, if we assume be hungry is a predicate that applies only to atomic 
individuals, then we must assign a Cov that has singleton cells, or else the sentence 
would be doomed to be false. Likewise, the fact that we may choose a cover with 
singleton or non-singleton cells for a mixed predicate l ike build a raft i s  information 
that comes from the predicate itself. 
To sum up, the distinction between distributive and collective readings of a 
sentence is captured not by means of distinct NP types such as groups and sums (as 
in Landman 1 989, Lasersohn 1 995) ,  but by means of a generalized distributivity 
operator whose interpretation is partly context dependent. 
3. 1 .  More on the Assignment of Values to Cov 
Lasersohn ( 1 995) raises the following objection to the generalized distributivity 
theory. S ince the value of Cov is a cover of the whole universe of discourse, i t  is  
possible that the value J be assigned to Cov in (20) ,  repeated below as (27) .  
(27) (Part( Cov )(hungry'))( the.boys ') 
(28) 'v'x [xE ICovlg & xdthe .boys' lg - xElhungry' lg] 
(29) J = { { a } , { c } , { b ,s , t } }  
The difference between J and I is that in J B ill does not occupy a singleton cell : he 
is in a cell with the two non-boys, Stan and Tom. Call this an il l-fitting cover, 
because i t  is i l l-fitting with respect to the set of boys -- there is no set of covers 
whose union is equivalent to the set of boys. 
A consequence of assigning this type of cover to Cov in  (27) is  that the 
semantics in some sense 'doesn't care' whether Bill is hungry or not. S ince the set 
{ b,s,t } is not a subset of the set { a,b,c } , there is  no cell containing Bi l l  that satisfies 
the restriction of the quantifier. The sentence can come out true whether Bill i s  
hungry or not. 
Lasersohn objects that this is highly undesirable, on the grounds that it means 
that John and Mary went to school could come out true even if Mary stayed home, 
a somewhat counterintuitive result. In response, Schwarzschild argues that to allow 
such a choice of cover would be so uncooperative of a speaker as to be"pathological , "  
and suggests that whi le i t  might be possible to  formulate a rule that prevents the 
choice of such a cover, i t  is more plausible to simply assume that pathological covers 
are ruled out on general principle. 
I agree with Schwarzschild that we should assume that speakers are 
cooperative in their intended choice of covers, but wish to suggest that i l l-fitting 
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covers are not necessarily so 'pathological' as either he or Lasersohn believe them to 
be. We quite commonly find ourselves in circumstances where it i s  not necessary to 
be precise down to each and every individual, as our summer camp scenarios from 
section 2 were intended to show. So perhaps in precisely these circumstances ill­
fitting covers do some work for us -- they allow us to be a l i ttle bit vague . 
I propose that we should allow for the possibility of i l l-fitting covers . This 
gives us a way to capture pragmatic weakening without any further revision to our 
semantics on the generalized distributivity theory of plurals .  Furthermore, since it 
i s  the job of pragmatics to assign a value to Cov in the first place, by capturing 
pragmatic weakening with ill-fitting covers, we have put responsibility for pragmatic 
weakening in its proper place: in the pragmatics. 
We can rely on the cooperativeness of speakers to ensure that pragmatic 
weakening does not go too far. For example, compare the sentences in (30) and (3 1 ) .  
(30) The boys are hungry 
(3 1 )  The boys passed the final exam 
It is easy to imagine a situation in which (30) is true ,  even though not every boy is 
hungry (see section 2) .  On the other hand, it would be pretty uncooperative to report 
(3 1 )  to the school principal when in fact three boys failed, because the principal must 
be concerned with the failing or passing of each student. 
Final ly ,  i t  should be pointed out that pragmatic weakening works the same 
way for col lective predicates as it  does for distributive predicates. The proposal I 
make here inherits from the generalized distributivity theory the feature that 
collective and distributive predication are not separate mechanisms of the grammar. 
So we don't need to make any independent statement about how pragmatic 
weakening might work with 'groups' or other entities. 
For example, take (32) on a collective reading, meaning that the boys together 
built a single raft. 
(32) The boys built a raft 
(33) (Part(Cov)(built' ) (the .boys') 
(34) \7'x [xE ICovlg & xdthe .boys' lg - xE lbuilt .raft ' l g] 
(35) L = { { a,b } ,  { c ,s ,t } } 
Suppose Adam and Bil l  did all the work, while Chris drank lemonade . Then we 
might be will ing to assert (32) as true. If we are, we can assign a cover l ike L to Cov 
in (33 ) .  S ince L is an il l -fitting cover that puts Chris in a cell with non-boys, the 
sentence makes no assertion about whether Chris actually participated in the raft­
building. 
I should point out that although I use very specific values for Cov in my 
i l l ustrations, I do not suppose that speakers and hearers are always aware of the 
values to such a high level of precision . It is more accurate to say that speakers and 
hearers are in some sense guessing at the sort of cover that the other has in mind. I 
take it that this is true for pragmatically-determined domain-of-quanti fication 
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variables in general (see von Fintel 1 994 for some discussion) . What is important is 
that we allow for the possibility of ill-fitting covers. Then the process of figuring out 
what value one's conversational partner has in mind will mean that one has to leave 
open the possibility of an ill-fitting cover, and thus of pragmatic weakening. 
4. One Consequence: A Proposal for the Semantics of all 
In this section I will propose that the 'maximizing' or 'totality' effect of all is 
essentially an 'anti-pragmatic-weakening' effect. We wil l  see that one consequence 
of this approach is that all does not have any quantificational force of its own. 
Recall that the contrast to be explained is the one in (36-37) .  
(36) The boys are hungry 
(37) The boys are all hungry 
The difference between these two sentences is that (37)  is a stronger statement than 
(36) .  Given the proposal I made in section (3) ,  we can say that the source of the 
weakness of (36) is  the fact that i t  allows at least for the possibility of pragmatic 
weakening. 
In contrast, let us say that all's contribution to (37) is to rule out the possibil i ty 
of pragmatic weakening. It does this by disallowing the choice of an ill-fitting cover. 
Or, another way to say this is  that all requires a good-fitting cover, where good fit is 
to be understood as the opposite of ill fit. 
Let us define a relation good fit between a cover and an NP-denotation ( i .e .  
a set). A cover is a good fit for this set if there isn't any element or member of the set 
that's stuck in a cell with some non-members. Another way to say this is that the 
cover is a good fit if every element of the set is in a cell of the cover that is a subset 
of that set. We can define this formally as in (38) .  
(38)  Good fit: Igf(Cov)(X)lg is true iff 'v'Y[YEX - :::JZ[ZEICovlg & yEZ & Z<:;X]]  
The contribution of all  to a sentence is simply to demand that the value assigned to 
Cov is a good fit. So (37) can be translated according to the translation rule in (39) .  
(39) Translation rule for sentences with all :  
A sentence of the form [sNP all VP] where N is the translation of NP and 
Part(Cov)(v) is the translation of VP, has the following translation : 
(Part(Cov)(V» (N) & gf(COV)(N) 
(40) The boys are all hungry 
(4 1) (Part(Cov)(hungry'» (the.boys') & gf(Cov)(the.boys') 
This translation rule and the definition of good fit in (38) guarantee that (37) can only 
be true if each boy is hungry .  This accounts for the judgment that (37)  is ' stronger' 
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than (36). (36) may be judged true in some contexts where not every boy i s  hungry ; 
(37) will never be judged true in such a context. 
Because I have adopted from the generalized distributivity theory a 
mechanism for collectives that is the same as for distributives, except for the value 
assigned to the variable Cov, this hypothesis about the meaning of all can be applied 
to collective predicates straightforwardly. There i s  no need to introduce new 
semantic primitives such as T or distributive subentailments. 
The good fit relation applies in exactly the same way to collectives. So  (42) 
is  translated as (43). 
(42) The boys all built a raft 
(43) (Part(Cov)(built'» (the.boys') & gf(Cov)(the.boys') 
Because all imposes a good fit requirement on the value assigned to Cov, (42) cannot 
be true in a context where one of the boys did not participate in the raft building .  
4. 1 .  Collective Predicates 
I say in the previous section that the account of all given here predicts that we should 
expect all to occur with collective predicates. This is  true, and it means that I do not 
face the problem that Dowty and Link faced, which was how all can combine wi th 
collective predicates. 
But instead, I face an inverse problem, because although i t  i s  true that all 
occurs with some collective predicates, there are other collectives that do not allow 
all .  Instead of trying to explain why all can occur with any collective predicates, I 
have to explain why there should be any collective predicates that .disallow all. 
There is  a subclass of collective predicates that don't allow all that Dowty 
called "pure cardinality predicates . "  He had in mind predicates like be a big group ,  
and be  numerous. 
(44) #The boys are all a big group 
Taub ( 1 989) expanded on Dowty's class with the following examples of predicates 
that also disallow all. 
(45) #The senators all passed the pay raise 
(46) #The students all elected a president 
Taub gave an interesting account of this subclass of collective predicates : she 
pointed out that they pattern as states and achievements in thei r  aktionsart 
classification . The collective predicates that do allow all, in contrast, are activities 
and accomplishments. Unfortunately Taub does not offer an explanation for this fact ,  
and I do not have anything to say about i t here either. 
What I do wish to point out about these predicates is that they also do not 
allow pragmatic weakening. We can see this by applying the same tests for 
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entailment/implicature that we saw earlier in section (2). For example ,  we saw 
earlier that in a sentence like the boys are hungry, the 'maximality' of the boys can 
be denied without contradiction. This is not so for the sentences in (47-48) ,  which 
are quite odd. 
(47) #The boys are a big group, but not John and Bill !but not all of them 
(48) ??The students elected a president, but Kerry and Jan didn't do anything!but 
not all of them. 
We also saw that the 'maximality' of the plural NP could be reinforced without 
redundancy, but again, with the subclass of predicates that disallow all, the sentences 
come out distinctly odd. 
(49) ??The boys - - in fact, the entire lot of them -- are a big group 
(50) ??The students -- in fact ,  the entire lot of them -- e lected a president 
I conclude that these sentences do not allow pragmatic weakening. 
If the function of all is to eliminate the possibility of pragmatic weakening, 
then it is clear on an intuitive level why all should be infelicitous with these 
predicates :  it cannot possibly add anything to the sentence. Let us implement this 
formal ly by supposing that felicitous use of all presupposes that pragmatic 
weakening is possible. With predicates that do not allow pragmatic weakening, this 
presupposition is not satisfied and so the infelicity of (44)-(46) is  a case of 
presupposition failure. 
We now have an explanation for aU's distribution that does not suffer from 
the circularity of Dowty's distributive subentai lments idea. We predict that 
predicates that do not allow pragmatic weakening should not allow all, and we have 
independent tests for pragmatic weakening. 
Of course, we would still like an explanation for why these predicates do not 
allow pragmatic weakening. Probably something like Dowty'S notion of distributive 
subentailments will ultimately prove to be relevant. But in the absence of 
independent evidence for these , the idea doesn't do very much work for us .  
Finally, these predicates show an interesting interaction with context, as 
pointed out to me by Veneeta Dayal (p .c . ) .  In some contexts, these predicates do 
allow pragmatic weakening, and in these same contexts, we find that all is permitted 
as well ,  as expected on the account argued for here . 
For example, suppose we are in an elementary school and the students from 
each grade are electing a president. In this situation, where the students refers to the 
entire student body, but we understand that it is subgroups of students (by grade) who 
are doing the electing, it is possible to say (5 1 ) .  
(5 1 )  The students have elected a president, but the fourth graders haven't yet. 
Where (5 1 )  means, the first graders, the second graders, the third graders , and the 
fifth graders have each elected a president, but not the fourth graders . 
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As expected, in this same context, we can say (52) .  
(52) The students have al l  elected a president. 
Where (52) means every grade has completed its elections .  
I take these sentences to be further evidence that we need an account of 
plurality and all that has a context-dependent component .  
4.2.  all and any: A Comparison to Kadmon and Landman (1993) 
The analysis of all proposed here bears a striking resemblance at certain points to the 
proposal made by Kadmon and Landman ( 1 993) for any. In that paper, Kadmon and 
Landman give an analysis of any in which several of its properties, including its 
distribution and its use as a negative polarity item and a free-choice item, follow from 
its interpretation. Their analysis has three points that are relevant here . 
Quantificational Force. Kadmon and Landman propose that any doesn't have 
quantificational force of its own. Instead an NP with any is an indefinite NP. The 
apparent quantificational force of any comes from two sources that have been 
independently shown to be associated with indefinites :  the existential force of 
negative polarity any comes from existential closure ,  and the universal force of free­
choice any comes from generic quantification . 
Reduced Tolerance of Exceptions. The contribution of any to a sentence is 
to indicate "reduced tolerance of exceptions" (p. 356) .  It does this by performing the 
operation of 'widening' on the domain of quantification .  The idea is that any 
indicates we should consider a wider domain of quantification, and in so doing wi l l  
make the statement with any stronger than the corresponding statement without any . 
Distribution. The distribution of any follows from its function. If widening 
the domain doesn't result in a stronger statement, then any is infelicitous .  This is the 
case in, for example , * John saw any woman . Any woman gets existential force in 
this sentence, and widening the domain of an existential quantifier (not under the 
scope of negation) does not make the sentence stronger. In contrast, John didn 't see 
any woman is felicitous because if the existential is under the scope of negation, then 
widening its domain does in fact result in a stronger statement. 
Each of these points of Kadmon and Landman's analysis has a counterpart in 
the proposal I 've made here for all. First, I 've proposed that all doesn't have any 
quantificational force of its own, but instead is related to the quantification 
introduced by the Part operator of a plural predicate . 
Second, the maximizing effect is quite similar to the notion of reduced 
tolerance of exceptions, and the mechanisms employed to account for these notions 
are similar as well . Maximizing is accomplished by the good fit requirement imposed 
by all. The effect of requiring a good fit is that the domain of quantification of the 
Part operator is  as wide as it can be with respect to the subject NP. 
Finally, the distribution of all is  claimed to follow from the fact that if 
pragmatic weakening is not possible, then all will  fail to contribute anything to the 
sentence, and so be infelicitous. It i s  only when all has the potential to make the 
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sentence a stronger statement that i t  i s  fel icitous. 
4.3. all and both 
Modulo different cardinality requirements (both presupposes a cardinality of exactly 
two; all a cardinality of (perhaps) 3 or more) all and both have the same distribution.4 
Both can occur with strictly distributive predicates as in (53)-(54); it does not 
disambiguate mixed-extension predicates as in (55)-(56) ; and it is fel icitous with 
collective predicates as in  (57)-(58) .  
(53) The boys are hungry 
(54) The boys are both hungry 
(55) The girls built a raft 
(56) The girls both built a raft (cf. EverylEach girl built a raft) 
(57) The students shared a pizza 
(58) The students both shared a pizza 
(cf. *EverylEach student shared a pizza (on internally reciprocal reading» 
In l ight of these facts I propose that both, l ike all, has as its interpretation that it 
imposes a good fit requirement on the value assigned to Cov. The following 
translation rule i s  adapted from (39) . 
(59) Translation rule for sentences with both : 
A sentence of the form [,NP both VP] where N i s  the translation of NP and 
Part(Cov)(v) is the translation of VP, has the following translation: 
(Part(CoV)(V»(N) & gf(Cov)(N) 
5. Other Consequences 
5. 1 .  Questions with Universal Quantifiers 
In this section we will see, first, that the idea that all is not a universal quantifier has 
some good consequences in addition to those I have already discussed; the case in 
point is questions with universal quantifiers. Second, I want to show that in at least 
some cases where all fall s  in  with the class of universal quantifiers we can explain 
all's behavior without being forced to say that all is itself a universal quantifier, and 
there we will look at exceptive phrases. 
Questions with every in subject position license three different types of 
answers, as has been shown in  the work of Chierchia ( 1 993) and others cited there . 
These can be called the functional answer (60a) , the individual answer (60b) and the 
pair-list answer (6Oc) .  
ON DEFINITE PLURAL NP's AND THE MEANING OF ALL 
(60) Who/which woman did every boy kiss? 
a. His mother 
b. Judith 
c. John kissed Mary, Bi l l  kissed Sue . . .  
If we  change every boy to a l l  the boys the list answer i s  no  longer possible . 
(6 1 )  Who/which woman did all the boys kiss? 
a. Their mothers 
b. Judith 
c. #John kissed Mary, Bil l  kissed Sue . . .  
We  will see shortly that the possibility o f  the list answer to (60) hinges crucially on  
the presence o f  universal quantifier every in the question. I f  all is also a universal 
quantifier, then the oddness of (6 1 c) is quite unexpected. However, in  the proposal 
I have made here we don't expect (6 1 c) to have the same status as (60c) .  
Before we go on to see how the l is t  answer to (6Oc) is licensed, I should point 
out that list answers can also be licensed when both the subject and the object are 
plural terms. List answers to these questions have been argued by Dayal ( 1 992) and 
Krifka ( 1 992) to be an independent phenomenon from the list answer shown in (6Oc) .  
These list answers are related to the phenomenon of dependent plurals (Scha 1 98 1 ) , 
and do not show subject-object asymmetries. Since all combines with plural s ,  to 
avoid interference from this phenomenon I will stick to examples using the 
unambiguously singular which woman as the object rather than the unmarked-for­
number who. 
Chierchia ( 1 993)  proposed that the availability of list answers to questions 
with universal quantifiers is based in part on the fact that a universal quantifier has 
a minimal witness set that i s  the set denoted by the common noun. 
Let 's see in outline how this works. Consider the question (62) . 
(62) Which woman did every boy kiss? 
The structure that Chierchia interprets is shown in (63), and its interpretation 
is given below in (64) . 
(64) AP::lA[W(every .boy',A) & P( Ap::lfE [A- woman'] ::lxEA [p=kiss(x) ( f(x) ) ] ) ]  
For Chierchia, the complementizer introduces existential q uant ification over a 
function from kissers to kissees . The wh-phrase which woman denotes the set of 
contextually salient women, and so provides the range of the function. To get the 
domain of the function, we must be able to extract a set from the denotation of DPj . 
If DPj is a universal quantifier we can use its minimal witness set, the set of boys, as 
the domain of the function. 
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If all were a universal quantifier then we should expect that this same process 
would l icense a l i st answer to (6 1 ) .  On the other hand, on the analys is  I have 
proposed here we do not expect all to behave l ike every in this respect, s ince it i s  not 
a universal quantifier. So we do not expect it to l icense a pair-li s t  reading .  
I t  is quite a straightforward matter to give a derivation for the correct reading. 
Assume that prenominal all, l ike floated all, requires a good fit rel at ion between the 
cover assigned to Cov and the subject NP. Then (65) is interpreted as in (66) .  
(65) Which woman did all the boys kiss? 
(66) Ap3x[woman'(x) & p:(Part(Cov)(kiss'(x)))(the.boys') & gf(Cov)(the.boys') 
Another way to say this i s  that (66) i s  a set of propositions that looks like (67) .  
(67) { (Part(Cov)(kiss(Mary))(the.boys') & gf(Cov)(the.boys') 
(Part(Cov)(kiss(Sue))(the.boys') & gf(Cov)(the.boys') 
(Part(Cov)(kiss(EIlen))(the.boys') & gf(Cov)(the.boys') . . .  } 
So we correctly expect that (65) l icenses only the individual answer. 
5. 2. Exception Phrases 
In this section I wi l l  take one example of a phenomenon where all NP has been 
shown to behave like universally quantified NP's, and show that we can maintain the 
generalization, and the analysis of it , without giving up the idea that all NP is not a 
universal quantifier. We wil l  also see additional evidence for pragmatic weakening.  
Space restrictions mean I can only give a sketch of the idea. 
Von Fintel ( 1 994) shows that there are two types of exception phrases that 
can be distinguished by thei r  d istribution. The distribution of but-phrases is more 
l imi ted than the distribution of except-phrases , and von Fintel offers an analysis in 
which the more l imi ted d istribution of but-phrases can be explained by their 
semantics. The data that show the distribution is in (68). 
(68) Everyone but Mary 
No one but Mary 
All  my friends but Chris 
*Most of my friends but C hris 
*Some of my friends but Chris  
*The girls but  Chris 
The generali zation is that only the universal quantifiers allow but-phrases .  Von 
Fintel 's explanation for this generalization is that but-phrases require that the 
exception set they name be the unique exception set that can make the sentence true, 
and only the universal quantifiers guarantee the uniqueness of an exception set. 
The problem we want to address here is  how all could behave like a universal 
quantifier despite the claim I've made that i t  is not one. To understand this ,  we first 
need to see why but-phrases are not permitted with simple definites : we will see that 
this is because simple definites do not guarantee the uniqueness of the exception set. 
Exception phrases are 'domain subtractors . '  So, for example, in the sentence 
ON DEFINITE PLURAL NP's AND THE MEANING OF A LL 
every student but Donna played volleyball, the but-phrase gives us instructions to 
subtract Donna from the set of students, and then combine .till!! set with the universal 
quantifier every. Furthermore, but adds an additional requirement that { d }  be the 
unique set of non-playing students . 
But because of pragmatic weakening, definite plurals cannot guarantee the 
uniqueness of the exception set. Imagine we are in a situation where the students 
denotes { a,b,c,d } .  The students are in gym class where they are playing volleybal l ,  
but Donna is injured, and Bi l l  forgot h i s  gym shorts .  Now let's consider (69) .  
(69) *The students but Donna played volleybal l .  
Because we allow i ll-fitting covers, this sentence could come out true, even though 
{ d }  i s  not the unique exception set that makes it so. Bill also did not play volleyball ,  
but this can be captured by means of an ill-fitting cover, in which Bi l l  occupies a cell 
with non-students . Of course, the sentence could also be true if we said . . .  but Donna 
and Bill. But then there are two exception sets that could, depending on the value 
assigned to Cov, make the sentence true: { d} and { d,b } ,  and this violates the 
uniqueness condition imposed by but. 
The possibility of i l l-fitting covers is what makes i t  possible to have non­
unique exception sets, despite the fact that the Part operator introduces universal 
quantification over the set of students. Note that without the notion of pragmatic 
weakening we would not have an explanation for the inabil ity of definites to take but­
phrases .  And since all rules out pragmatic weakening, it does guarantees that there 
wil l be a unique exception set, thus explaining why all NP allows a but phrase. So  
von Fintel 's analysis can be  preserved, while a t  the same time we are not forced to  
conclude that al l  is a universal quantifier. 
5. 3. Complementary Distribution 
Finally, there is another phenomenon that can be explained by the analysis of 
definites and all that I have proposed here. The following examples show contexts 
where the and the . . .  all are in complementary distribution, if we take Adam and Bi l l  
to be members of the set  denoted by the boys. To my knowledge, these facts have 
not been noted before. 
(70) a. Adam and Bill are bald 
b .  #In fact, the boys are bald 
b' .  In fact, the boys are ALL bald 
(7 1 )  a. If Adam and Bi l l  are bald, 
b.  #then the boys are bald 
b ' .  then the boys are ALL bald 
(72) a. Which boys are bald? 
b. #the boys are bald 
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b' . The boys are ALL bald. 
There are two questions that come up here. One is, why are the (b) sentences 
infelic i tous in a context where the (a) sentences have been uttered? And secondly ,  
what i s  the role of focus here? 
First let us see why (70b), for example, i s  infelicitous. S ince we have 
supposed that one cannot be sure about the value assigned to Cov, a sentence like 
(70b) only guarantees that some boy or other is bald (assuming that vacuous 
quantification i s  not allowed). It does not entail anything stronger than that. So i t  i s  
infelcitous following (70a) because, a s  we  have already seen, information entailed 
by the context cannot be repeated (reinforced) without redundancy. (Sadock 1 978) 
The examples in  (73)-(74) bring out this point. In the same context we see 
with plural definites above, a sentence with some is infelicitous, but a sentence with 
most i s  felicitous, showing that the entailed force of an assertion l ike (70b) i s  only as 
strong as some, and not most (as pointed out to me by Veneeta Dayal) .  
(73) Adam and B il l  are bald. #In fact ,  some of the boys are bald .  
(74) Adam and Bi l l  are bald. In fact ,  most of the boys are bald .  
Next, we might wonder why focus on the does nothing to alleviate the infel ici ty of 
the (b) examples. After all , i f  the i s  a supremum operator, why can't we focus it to 
indicate maximali ty?  And why is focus on all fel ic i tous in the (b') sentences? 
It appears that focus on the i s  fel ic i tous only when the famil iarity or 
uniqueness of the referent is at stake, which is consistent with the Kamp/Heim 
approach to defin i tes and indefinites. So  (75) i s  perfectly fel icitous. 
(75) A :  I went to a meeting and spoke to alsome/three/a few executive(s) . 
B :  You mean you spoke to THE executive(s) who i s/are planning the merger. 
Note that the expressions somelthree!afew are fel icitous only on their 'weak' or 'non­
partit ive '  readings (see also Buring 1 995 on this point). In contrast, on their strong 
readings they cannot fel icitously contrast with the .  
(76) A: There were children all over the playground. MOST/SOMEITHREE/A 
FEW children played horseshoes. 
B: #You mean THE children played horseshoes. 
So independent of what we say about all, the focus value of the can only contrast 
fami l iarity/uniqueness, not proportion. 
The account of all proposed here predicts that its focus value should be a set 
of alternative 'fits , '  of which 'good fit' is just one type. We can imagine other sorts 
of fits for values of Cov, in which some boy ar other (or maybe several of them) i s  
in  a cell with non-boys. The reader can verify that this means the se t  of alternatives 
to (77) is equivalent to (78) .  
ON DEFINITE PLURAL NP's AND THE MEANING OF A LL 
(77) The boys are ALL bald 
(78) { bald'(A) , bald' (B) ,  bald' (C) , bald'(A+B) ,  bald'(A+C) . . .  bald ' (A+B+C) } 
Now we can see why (77) i s  fel icitous as the b' response i n  (70-72) .  The theory I 
have proposed here predicts that (78) is the focus value of (77), and so we expect that 
a context in which (78) or some part of it is under discussion (as in (70a) , (7 1 a) ,  and 
(72a» will be one that allows felicitous use of focus on all. 
Endnotes 
*1 wish to thank Roger Schwarzschild ,  Maria B ittner, Yael Sharvit , Yoad W inter, 
students and faculty at Rutgers University, and the audience at SALT for comments, 
discussion, and suggestions. Spec ial thanks to Veneeta Dayal for her insights on so 
many levels .  Of course I alone am responsible for what is printed here. 
1 .  To keep things s imple, I will concern myself in this paper primaril y  wi th 'floated' 
or postnominal all. I do not take a position on the syntactic phenomenon of floating. 
I expect that what I say about the interpretation of floated all applies as well to 
prenominal all, at least in  general , although there are some differences between them. 
2. Landman ( 1 989, 1 996) allows for some pragmatic weakening by allowing plural 
noun phrases to denote e ither 'sums' or 'groups; '  one property of groups is that they 
do not allow distributivity and hence can heave less-than-universal force. However, 
in h i s  l ater work it seems that he takes the position that the boys in  ( I I )  is not a 
group, and so he would not allow for pragmatic weakening in this case. 
3 .  Anna Szabolcsi questioned whether i t  is possible to get weakening even wi th a set 
of just two individuals .  It is clearly much harder to get pragmatic weakening with a 
sentence l ike ( i ) .  
i .  My parents are tall 
Some measure of the difficulty might be attributable to the fact that be tall is an 
individual-level predicate. In contrast, (ii) seems to be fine i f  Mom and Dad went 
to the bowling alley and Dad i s  only planning to watch. 
i i .  My parents went bowling. 
In addition, Jason Merchant (i i i) and Geoff Nunberg (iv) pointed out to me that ever 
seems to bring out the weakening effect, as in 
i i i .  Have your parents ever been to Europe? 
iv .  Have the boys ever hit the girls? 
Both questions seem to demand an affirmative answer even if  only one individual 
makes the sentence true .  
4 .  Bi l l  Ladusaw tell s  me that he and several other speakers disagree with some of 
these judgments . I have checked them with several speakers, though, and found that 
many people accept (56) and (58) .  There could be a dialectical difference, or, as he 
suggested, a generational difference. 
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